Why do peacekeeping agencies, such as the United Nations, pursue certain strategies and not others? Most accounts suggest that peacekeeping mandates reflect the interests of major parties, along with perceptions of how effectively certain strategies will accomplish the goals of peacekeeping. This article argues that another factorthe international normative environment, sometimes called 'global culture' -also shapes the design of peacekeeping operations in fundamental ways. Peacekeeping agencies seem predisposed to adopt strategies that conform with global culture, and to reject strategies that they view as normatively inappropriate, even if the rejected strategies are potentially more likely to accomplish the goals of peacekeeping. Changes in the international norms have been accompanied by corresponding shifts in peacekeeping policy; and UN officials have summarily rejected certain proposals for more effective peacekeeping, including the idea of establishing a new trusteeship system, on largely normative grounds. These observations suggest that global culture limits the range of possible policies that peacekeepers can realistically pursue.
Introduction
The study of peacekeeping was something of an isolated backwater in the field of International Relations for most of the Cold War, 1 but a succession of new operations launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s -in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and elsewhere -propelled peacekeeping out of obscurity and into the mainstream of International Relations scholarship. Much of the early post-Cold War writing on peacekeeping was comprised of single case studies that were criticized for lacking theoretical foundations. Since then, the study of peacekeeping has matured into a more explicitly theoretical enterprise, driven in part by the goal of identifying and explaining the conditions that make some peacekeeping operations more successful than others. 2 The next step in the development of the subfield is to look beyond the operation-level mechanics of peacekeeping and make connections to theoretical debates taking place in the larger International Relations (IR) discipline and other disciplines (Paris, 2000) . Exploring such connections would help to situate the phenomenon of peacekeeping within the broader processes and puzzles of international politics. Although a few scholars have already begun this process, 3 many possible linkages between peacekeeping and theoretical debates in other subfields remain unexplored.
To illustrate the potential benefits of this research strategy, this article investigates connections between peacekeeping and the 'world polity' school of sociology. 4 Like other sociologists, world polity scholars study the norms, customs and widely held beliefs -or 'culture' -of human societies; but rather than focusing on the culture of a particular national or religious group, these scholars treat the entire world as a single society, and argue that there is a distinct global culture that comprises the formal and informal rules of international social life. Among other things, global culture defines whom the principal actors in world politics should be, how these actors should organize themselves internally, and how they should behave. These arguments should be familiar to followers of the English School of International Relations (who maintain that international social rules legitimize and empower the state as the principal unit of world politics 5 ) and to students of constructivist IR theory (who contend that cultural environments shape the basic character or 'identity' of states and other international actors 6 ). World polity theory offers new insights into why peacekeepers pursue certain strategies and not others. The prevailing view in the peacekeeping literature is that the mandates and procedures of particular operations emerge from negotiations among interested parties -including members of the United Nations Security Council (the body that is most often responsible for authorizing new missions), governments of the states that host these missions (whose consent is normally sought), and governments of troop-contributing countries -and, furthermore, that officials within peacekeeping agencies help to define mandates by advising governments on the procedures and strategies that have worked well in previous missions. member states are predisposed to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture, and they are disinclined to pursue strategies that deviate from these norms. In short, the design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others.
I develop this argument in two parts, focusing primarily on the world's main peacekeeping organization, the United Nations (UN). First, I identify correspondences between the strategy of peacekeeping and global cultural norms over time, showing how changes in peacekeeping policy paralleled shifts in the prevailing norms of global culture. Peacekeepers, for instance, have consistently promoted the institutional form of the Westphalian state (a polity defined by exclusive jurisdiction over a bounded territory) rather than some other 'non-state' form of political organization. This prejudice in favor of Westphalian statehood reflects the enduring centrality of territorial sovereignty in the normative structure of world politics.
The perceived legitimacy of different types of states, however, changes over time. At the end of the Cold War, one particular form of domestic governance -liberal democracy -emerged as 'the only model of government with any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal in the world' (Diamond et al., 1990: x) . Simultaneously, peacekeeping agencies not only continued to espouse the institutional form of the Westphalian statehood, but now also began to tout liberal democratic institutions and values as the 'appropriate' model of domestic governance in states that hosted operations -mirroring the shift in the prevailing norms of legitimate statehood.
Second, I show that peacekeeping agencies have been unwilling to consider strategies that appear to contravene global cultural norms. I explore the example of 'international trusteeship', a form of international receivership for states that are incapable of governing themselves peacefully. Some commentators contend that implementing a trusteeship strategy would improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping in fostering stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states, yet UN officials apparently reject trusteeship a priori as a violation of global cultural norms, without seriously considering trusteeship's possible benefits as a technique for promoting peace. In this sense, global culture appears both to prescribe certain peacekeeping policies and to proscribe others. Because certain peacekeeping strategies are widely viewed as normatively unacceptable (or at least incompatible with the prevailing global culture), peacekeepers are effectively precluded from pursuing these strategies, regardless of how effective such approaches might be at promoting peace. This argument evokes James March and Johan Olsen's discussion of two different 'logics of action', or processes by which political actors define goals and decide how to behave Olsen, 1989, 1998) . 8 The logic of 'consequences', or 'effectiveness', portrays political actors as rational utilitymaximizers who select strategies that are most likely to achieve a desired end. By contrast, the logic of 'appropriateness' suggests that political actors choose their strategies in accordance with prevailing norms of proper conduct -that they seek to 'do the right thing' in a given social context. As March and Olsen explain, these two logics are not mutually exclusive, since most political action involves elements of both logics. 'Political action', they write, 'generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1998: 952) . In this article, I attempt to show how a logic of appropriateness shapes the practice of peacekeeping. I do not claim that the prescriptive and proscriptive functions of global culture explain everything, or that the logic of effectiveness does not also influence the design and implementation of peacekeeping policies, but rather, that scholars have largely overlooked the importance of logics of appropriateness in the formulation of peacekeeping policy. Greater attention to the cultural environment that surrounds peacekeeping could deepen our understanding of why peacekeepers do what they do.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows -first, I explore the changing character of global culture, focusing on the evolution of the norms of state sovereignty. Second, I show how changes in peacekeeping practice have paralleled shifts in global culture. Third, I examine the constraints that global culture places on the conduct of peacekeeping, using the example of international trusteeship as a normatively prohibited alternative peacekeeping strategy. Fourth, I consider some implications of my argument for the study of both peacekeeping and global culture.
Global Culture and Sovereignty
One of the truisms in the study of IR is that the principle of state sovereignty has been the foundational norm of international society at least since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and that the idea of sovereignty effectively crowded out competing conceptions of how human societies might be organized -including empires, colonies and feudal arrangements -to the point where the Westphalian state is now, in the words of Alexander Murphy, 'the only imaginable spatial framework for political life ' (1996: 91) . Sovereignty, however, is not a static concept -there have been periodic revolutions in its meaning, two of which I will describe in this section.
The first major transformation in the concept of sovereignty began in the European Journal of International Relations 9(3) late 18th century with the American and French Revolutions, which promoted the notion that legitimate states were those that expressed the interests of their citizens -a notion that spread to other countries in the ensuing decades. This new norm of legitimate statehood challenged the long-standing notion that state sovereignty rested in monarchical patriarchy and divine right, and it eventually developed into the 20th-century principle of national self-determination, or the idea that 'nations' should run their own affairs rather than being subject to foreign rule (Reus-Smit, 1999: 127-8) . After World War I, the principle of self-determination was used to justify the creation of new states for subjugated nationalities in Eastern and Central Europe. Later, after World War II, self-determination was applied to colonized peoples outside of Europe, serving as a rationale and impetus for decolonization (Crawford, 1993; Jackson, 1999: 444) .
International organizations became the repositories of the self-determination norm. The League of Nations, for example, was extensively involved in redrawing international boundaries in Eastern and Central Europe on the basis of nationality after World War I; and in the post-World War II period the United Nations elevated the norm of self-determination into a 'fundamental right' of all nations (Preamble of the UN Charter). The connection between self-determination and decolonization became even clearer in 1960, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning colonialism as 'alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation', and reaffirming that 'all peoples have a right to self-determination' (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514). 'From about this time', writes Robert Jackson, 'arguments to delay independence on empirical grounds (such as levels of development or education) were considered morally inferior to universal claims to self-determination ' (1993: 124) .
The second revolution in the meaning of sovereignty is still under way today. According to several observers, the institutions and practices of electoral or liberal democracy have emerged as a new standard of legitimate statehood since the end of the Cold War. Responding to the proliferation of internationally monitored elections, which are now routinely used to validate the political institutions of states that are undergoing regime transitions or emerging from crises (Carothers, 1997: 17-31) , Yale law professor Michael Reisman has argued that the process of legitimation through election-monitoring represents 'a new type of inclusive international recognition' that effectively renders a state's full membership in the international community contingent on the nature of the state's relationship with its own citizens (1999: 242). David Held goes one step further, claiming that liberal democracy has become 'the fundamental standard of political legitimacy in the current era ' (1998: 11) . Former UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali also acknowledged the existence of an 'emerging consensus' on the value of liberal democracy (Boutros-Ghali, 1996: para. 15) . Indeed, by 1995, over 60 percent of all the countries in the world were using popular elections to fill major public offices -as compared with only 46 percent at the Cold War's end in 1990 (Diamond, 1995) . While Francis Fukuyama's 1989 claim that humanity had reached the 'end point' in its ideological evolution almost certainly exaggerated the degree and permanence of liberalism's triumph, long-standing debates over the relative merits of competing forms of domestic governance have, it seems, drifted to the margins of world politics since the end of the Cold War and a 'remarkable consensus' has emerged around the liberal conception of democracy as the most legitimate form of domestic governance (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 75) .
Growing acceptance of liberal democratic values and institutions was also visible in the behavior and rhetoric of major international organizations, many of which have become vigorous promoters of liberal democracy and began to claim that elections were the only legitimate basis for governmental authority within states. Within the United Nations, for example, the ideological disputes of the Cold War had effectively prevented the organization from actively promoting liberal democracy -not least, because the very definition of democracy was a lightning rod for heated arguments in the General Assembly and Security Council. When the Cold War ended, however, the UN quickly and enthusiastically embraced liberal democracy. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali began issuing statements that not only defined democracy in decidedly Western-liberal terms ('that there shall be periodic and genuine elections; that power changes hands through popular suffrage . . .; that political opponents and minorities have a right to express their views') but also identified liberal democracy as the prerequisite for achieving a long list of other social goods, including development, human rights and peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1994 . The General Assembly also endorsed the principle of 'periodic and genuine elections' and authorized the creation of a new electoral assistance unit within the UN to help states in holding elections; 9 while the UN's specialized agencies, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, launched programs to support national democratization efforts. 10 Kofi Annan (2000) similarly described the 'principle of democracy' as 'the right of all people to take part in the government of their country through free and regular elections'. Such endorsements of liberal democracy by the UN secretary-general would have been virtually unthinkable during the Cold War. Yet, as Annan (1997) characterized the UN's new values and priorities, 'Support for democratization has become one of our major concerns.' A similar evolution took place in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Prior to 1990, member states of the OSCE operated on the principle of 'respecting each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations' (Kritz, 1993: 19) . But after popular revolutions swept across Eastern Europe in 1989, the organization passed a resolution declaring that 'the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe' (CSCE, 1990 (CSCE, : 1307 . The OSCE's democracy-promoting functions were concentrated in a new Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in Warsaw, with a mandate to help OSCE participating states 'to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and . . . to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions as well as promote democracy throughout society '. 11 The OAS also passed a resolution in June 1991 calling for 'the immediate convocation of a meeting . . . in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of any of the Organization's member states'.
12 Thus began a new period of activism in the promotion and defense of democratic governance by the OAS. The organization has since monitored elections in Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay and Surinam, and imposed sanctions following antidemocratic coups in Haiti and Peru (Schnably, 2000) . It has also established a new Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to 'provide guidance and support to the member states to strengthen their democratic institutions and procedures '. 13 Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also promoted a 'good governance' agenda since the end of the Cold War, requiring states to undertake political reforms in exchange for financial assistance, including measures to give their citizens 'a voice in governmental decisions and activities -not only through voting and representation but also through direct involvement in shaping and implementing programs that affect their lives and well-being' (World Bank, 1995: 5-6) . The lending policies of many national development agencies also underwent similar changes at the end of the Cold War. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the world's largest aid donor, has historically focused on programs that promote social and economic development in poor countries, especially in the areas of health, population and the environment, and until recently placed relatively little emphasis on democracy and human rights (Diamond, 1995: 13) . Under the Reagan administration in the 1980s, USAID initiated several programs to assist in the administration of justice and the conduct of democratic elections, particularly in Latin America. But in 1990 the agency identified the promotion of democracy as one of its central goals, announcing that 'allocations of USAID funds to individual countries will take into account their progress toward democratization', with the objective of placing 'democracy on a comparable footing with progress in economic reforms and the establishment of a market-oriented economy, key factors which are already used as criteria for allocating funds ', 14 Comparable changes have also taken place in the national aid agencies of other industrialized states, as virtually all major donor governments have placed increased emphasis on democracy and human rights in their allocations of development aid since the end of the Cold War, including Canada, the Nordic countries, Holland, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland and the European Union (Baylies, 1995; Blair, 1997; Commins, 1997; Forsythe, 1996; Islam and Morrison, 1996; Selbervik, 1997) . Even Japan, which has traditionally been reluctant to link aid to the policies of recipient governments, announced in 1992 that it would include progress to democracy among the principles that would guide the future apportionment of aid (Nelson and Eglinton, 1996) .
All of these developments suggest that liberal democracy has been emerging as a new standard of legitimate statehood in the post-Cold War period. As one group of commentators remarked in the mid-1990s, 'the primary debate now taking place within governments and many international organizations centers not around whether democracy and marketoriented reforms are desirable, but rather around how they can be supported most effectively by external actors, and how best to secure and target the necessary resources' (Armijo et al., 1994: 161) . Even critics of the liberal definition of democracy recognize its status as a new 'global norm' of domestic governance (Boron, 1995; Roth, 1995) .
Peacekeeping as a Product of Global Culture
The conduct of peacekeeping reflects the prevailing norms of global culture. During the Cold War, as we have seen, there was little international consensus on the virtues of any particular system of domestic governance. But there was general agreement on at least two principles -that Westphalian states were the principal legitimate actors in world politics, and that the norm of self-determination necessitated decolonization. Cold Warera peacekeeping mirrored this global culture. The initial peacekeeping missions of the post-World War II period saw the deployment of unarmed UN military personnel to monitor ceasefire lines between Israeli and Arab forces in 1948, and on the disputed border between India and Pakistan in 1949. The first armed peacekeeping mission was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was sent to the Middle East during the 1956 Suez Crisis in order to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli, British and French troops from Egypt, and subsequently to patrol the border between Egypt and Israel. These three missions established a model of 'traditional' UN peacekeeping that was repeated several times during the Cold Warspecifically, these operations performed tasks such as monitoring international borders that reinforced the principle of territorial sovereignty (Barnett, 1995) , but they also sought to avoid becoming involved in the domestic affairs of the countries in which they were deployed, and scrupulously avoided expressing views on the superiority of any particular system of domestic governance.
Only two of the 15 peacekeeping operations launched between 1948 and 1988 became involved in domestic governance issues (Ratner, 1996) . The first was the ill-fated mission to the former Belgian Congo in 1960, which set out to provide the government of the newly independent Republic of Congo with limited security assistance, but which got caught in a power struggle between the president and prime minister, and ultimately took over many of the functions of the Congolese government and forcibly suppressed a revolt in one of the country's provinces. The second was the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in western New Guinea, which administered the territory from October 1962 to April 1963, during its transition from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian sovereignty. While these two missions performed domestic political functions, they did so within countries that were undergoing the process of decolonization -at a time when colonialism was almost universally viewed as illegitimate. The characteristics of Cold War-era peacekeeping -including unquestioned support for the model of sovereign statehood, cultivated neutrality on questions of domestic governance and active support for decolonizationthus echoed and reinforced the prevailing norms of global culture.
From 1989 onward, two new types of peacekeeping missions displaced the traditional operations of the Cold War years.
15 First, several missions were deployed into ongoing civil conflicts with war-fighting mandatesmost notably, in Somalia and Bosnia. This represented a departure from the earlier practice of waiting for the fighting to stop before sending peacekeepers to observe an already-established peace. Second, new operations were deployed into post-conflict situations to oversee the implementation of comprehensive peace accords, which often included fundamental reform of domestic political, military, judicial and economic institutions. These multifunctional missions -sometimes called post-conflict 'peacebuilding' operations -have been the most common type of peacekeeping operation since the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, Rwanda, Mozambique, Bosnia, Croatia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Kosovo have each hosted peacebuilding missions in recent years.
Perhaps the most striking feature of these peacebuilding operations is that they have all sought to remake war-shattered states as liberal democracieswith popularly elected governments and civil liberties such as freedom of association and expression, which are presupposed by the idea of free and fair elections -on the grounds that this is the 'appropriate' model of domestic political organization for states to adopt (Paris, 2002) . In addition, the contemporary standard peacebuilding formula has involved economic liberalization, or measures aimed at promoting market-oriented economic reform in war-shattered states. These operations have been conducted by a wide range of international agencies -including not only the UN, but also regional organizations such as the OAS and OSCE, international financial institutions, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and national relief and development agencies -with relatively little central coordination. Yet, despite the number, variety and relative autonomy of the actors involved, most peacebuilding agencies have worked towards the transformation of war-shattered states into liberal market democracies.
The prescription for stable and lasting peace in Namibia, for example, included national elections, a new constitution emphasizing civil liberties and other human rights, and market-oriented economic adjustment, which was to be accomplished with the assistance of international agencies. In Mozambique and Angola -both former Portuguese colonies that had experienced bitter civil conflicts -internationally sponsored peace plans also called for free and fair elections and political liberalization. Similarly, Rwanda's tragically unsuccessful peace process (described in greater detail below) rested on the assumption that an expansion in political participation, culminating in the holding of democratic elections, would create the foundations for national reconciliation and peace. Elections have also taken place under the auspices or supervision of international peacebuilding missions in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor; while the IMF and World Bank have required most of these states to undertake market-oriented economic reforms in exchange for financial assistance.
This shift in the character of peacekeeping -away from the reluctance of traditional peacekeepers to become involved in the domestic realm, and toward active support by post-conflict peacebuilders for one particular model of domestic governance -have reflected changes that occurred in global culture at the end of the Cold War. New approaches to peacekeeping have mirrored the second revolution in the meaning of sovereignty: the emergence of a new standard of legitimate statehood -one that treats liberal democratic institutions and practices as the most appropriate model of domestic governance.
At the same time, however, some aspects of peacekeeping have remained relatively constant: including the tendency of international peacekeepers to uphold the basic form of the Westphalian state. There is no logical requirement for international agencies to resurrect failed states as states, rather than allowing war-torn regions to develop into some other kind of polity; and a number of observers recommend that the areas of the world in which states are especially prone to civil conflict, such as sub-Saharan Africa, should be allowed to evolve new types of 'non-state' political structures (Herbst, 1996-97) . But the conduct of peacekeeping nevertheless appears to be guided by a conviction that is widely shared in the world -that the Westphalian state is the 'highest form of political organization in the international system' (Lipschutz, 1992: 400) .
To view the strategies of peacekeeping in merely instrumental terms is to ignore the apparently close relationship between the prevailing norms of global culture and the conduct of peacekeeping. As we have seen, changes in the prevailing norms of global culture at the end of the Cold War preceded broad normative shifts in international organizations such as the UN, OAS, OSCE, IMF and World Bank, which in turn preceded corresponding changes in the character of peacekeeping. Put differently, these organizations embraced liberal democracy as the most desirable and legitimate form of domestic governance, reflecting larger shifts in global culture at the end of the Cold War. The ideological reorientation of these organizations ultimately shaped the way in which they practiced peacekeeping. In this sense, peacekeeping has been, and continues to be, a product of global culture.
Peacekeeping as a Prisoner of Global Culture
Just as peacekeeping agencies seem predisposed to act in ways that reflect the norms of global culture, they also appear disinclined to adopt strategies that might deviate from these norms. Global culture constrains the practice of peacekeeping by limiting the range of strategies that peacekeepers can realistically pursue. Peacekeeping agencies seem willing to rule out normatively unacceptable strategies a priori without even considering the potential effectiveness of these strategies as techniques for fostering peace, which is the stated goal of peacekeeping; and concerns about international propriety appear, at least on some occasions, to take precedence over considerations of operational effectiveness.
In recent years, for example, several commentators have suggested that peacekeeping operations would be more effective -that is, more likely to produce stable and lasting peace -if 'failed states' were placed under a new system of international trusteeship. The idea of trusteeship dates back to the League of Nations' system of mandates, or non-self-governing territories administered by select states on behalf of the League. The Covenant of the League required the administering states to provide for the 'welfare and development' of their charges, with the eventual goal of helping the mandates 'stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world' (Article 22). The Covenant imposed no time limit or schedule for achieving this goal. After World War II, the mandates system was incorporated into the UN's new Trusteeship Council, which oversaw the governance of several dependent territories, and which the UN Charter called upon 'to develop self-government [in each territory], to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions' (Article 73). All 11 trusteeship territories ultimately gained independence, although some took longer than others: Palau was the last, becoming independent in 1994, nearly 50 years after the founding of the UN.
Among the contemporary advocates of trusteeship is William Pfaff (1995 Pfaff ( , 1996 , who recommends the creation of a new system of 'disinterested neocolonialism', to be run by a consortium of African and European states, which would take over the administration of dangerously unstable countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Ali Mazrui (1994) calls for the revival of 'trusteeship' in Africa, which he characterizes as 'external recolonization' for countries that cannot govern themselves. Thomas Weiss (1995) also favors reviving a trusteeship system 'to handle temporarily the problems of states that have ceased to function, and to provide breathing space for civil society to be reconstituted'. David Rieff (1999) talks about the need for a new 'liberal imperialism', with trusteeship as a central component; and Michael Ignatieff (2002) contends that the United States is in danger of 'losing the peace' in Afghanistan if it does not commit itself to rebuilding the rule of law and a functioning state throughout the country. These observers, along with several others who have made similar proposals (Alger, 1998; Halperin et al., 1992; Helman and Ratner, 1992-93; Hodgson, 1996; Marks, 1999; Talbott, 1992) contend that peacekeeping, as practiced to date, has been an inadequate remedy to recurrent conflict in many of the countries that have experienced internal war and institutional collapse.
Why do some commentators think that trusteeship would be a more effective peacekeeping strategy for war-shattered states, and what exactly is the difference between trusteeship and the current approach to peacekeeping? The proponents of trusteeship do not speak with a single voice, but most make one or more of the following three arguments. First, recent peacekeeping operations have tended to be too short-lived to ensure lasting and stable peace in the countries that have hosted these missions. The occupation of Germany and Japan following World War II formally lasted seven and ten years respectively, followed by several years of what might be called informal occupation. During that time, both countries were rebuilt into relatively stable market democracies. By contrast, post-Cold War peacekeeping operations have often declared victory and withdrawn from war-shattered states in three years or less. The UN mission in Cambodia, for example, began in October 1991 and ended in September 1993. David Rieff (1999) claims that the Cambodia mission 'provided little more than a short respite' and that the UN should have stayed 'for a generation'. Henry Kamm (1998) , a longtime observer of Southeast Asia, agrees with Rieff but goes one step further, arguing that Cambodia's state and society are still so dysfunctional that the international community should go back into Cambodia, directly administer the country and 'gradually hand it back to a new generation of Cambodians, who will have matured with respect for their own people and will be ready to take responsibility for them'.
More recently, a few peacekeeping missions have been deployed with longer time horizons. The operation in Bosnia began in early 1996 under a plan to withdraw peacekeepers within 12 months, but that plan was thrown out and the operation is still ongoing more than five years later, with no anticipated termination date (at the time of writing). The mission in Kosovo, deployed in 1999, also seems likely to remain in place 'for a very long haul', or at least until a new modus vivendi can be worked out between ethnic Albanians and Serbs (Gray, 2000) . But the apparent open-endedness of these two operations is atypical of peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era, most of which have ended within a few years, in part because the peacekeeping agencies have themselves sought to terminate these operations as quickly as possible -usually after the first set of post-conflict elections.
In theory, peacekeepers might remedy this problem by following the Bosnian or Kosovo model of open-ended deployments for new missions, but proponents of trusteeship tend to advocate more fundamental change in the assumptions of these missions; in particular, efforts to reconstitute collapsed states should presume that long-term international administration of the territory may be required. The creation of a new international trusteeship mechanism would represent an explicit commitment to and acknowledgement of this principle. If collapsed states are placed under formal trusteeship, there is an expectation that international administration willas a matter of course -continue until the conditions for stable selfgovernment are achieved, which is one of the goals that advocates of trusteeship emphasize, on the grounds that longer-term international assistance is more likely to result in stable and lasting peace.
It is not just the transitory character of most peacekeeping missions that commentators have criticized, but also the practice of rushing war-shattered states through a series of far-reaching political and economic reforms in the fragile period immediately following the end of a civil war. Most peacekeeping missions conducted since the end of the Cold War have promoted the immediate democratization and marketization of host states, on the assumption that doing so would foster peace, but in practice, hurried efforts to transform war-shattered states into market democracies have sometimes generated unexpectedly destabilizing results (Paris, forthcoming) . In Angola, for instance, internationally sponsored elections held shortly after the negotiation of a ceasefire in 1992 did not serve as a basis for reconciliation, but were a catalyst for renewed war, spurring one of the parties, who did not accept the results of the election, to resume fighting. The 1994 massacres in Rwanda represented a conscious attempt by members of the Rwandan government to thwart the planned elections and power-sharing arrangements that were the centerpiece of the international peacekeeping effort in the country (Adelman, Suhrke with Jones, 1996; Jones, 1995: 227; Longman, 1997: 287; Makinda, 1996: 556) . In Bosnia, elections held in September 1996, less than a year after the belligerents agreed to stop fighting, served to consolidate and legitimize the power of the parties who had started the war in the first place and effectively reinforced 'the ethnic fault lines that tore the country apart' (Soloway, 1996: 48; see also International Crisis Group, 1999: 2, 11). Even UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan acknowledged that the holding of early elections in Bosnia was a 'mistake' because the elections consolidated and legitimized the power of exclusionist parties 'who caused the war' (quoted in Perlez, 1999) .
In East Timor, too, several international observers predicted that there would be bloodshed leading up to the 1999 referendum on independence (Knox, 1999; Le Monde, 1999) . Pro-independence campaigners, including the East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao, said that they would have preferred several years of quasi-autonomy to prepare for the referendum and independence (Shukman, 1999) . In spite of these warnings, however, the UN proceeded with the referendum and deployed only a small number of foreign observers and security forces (300 soldiers and 400 police) to oversee the elections, leaving the primary responsibility for protecting civilians to the Indonesian army. As expected, violence escalated in the days leading up to the vote, and, when it became clear that the results of the referendum strongly favored secession, anti-independence groups that were backed by the army began a campaign of violence against their political opponents in which scores of civilians were killed and as many as 500,000 displaced from their homes. Annan claimed to be surprised by these events, but why the UN failed to foresee this outcome, even after the organization's experience with abortive elections in other deeply divided societies such as Angola, remains unclear.
These and other cases have given rise to an extensive scholarship on the dangers of hasty democratization in deeply divided countries (Arfi, 1998; Austin, 1994; Ottaway, 1995; Paris, 1997; Snyder, 2000; Snyder and Ballantine, 1996; Sorenson, 1996) . Although this literature does not demonstrate that early votes or rapid democratization will necessarily endanger the prospects of establishing a stable and lasting peace in countries that have recently experienced civil conflict (indeed, many peacekeeping host states have succeeded in holding relatively peaceful elections), it does indicate that rapid liberalization is a risky peacekeeping strategy in the fragile circumstances of a war-shattered state.
Peacekeepers, however, have been reluctant to postpone elections, or even to slow the pace of democratization. Minor scheduling adjustments have occurred in a few cases -in Mozambique, for example, elections were delayed from October 1993 to October 1994. In Bosnia, although the first post-conflict national elections, described above, took place on schedule in September 1996, international officials delayed municipal elections until September 1997 because of 'massive registration irregularities' (Kornblum, 1996) . In Kosovo, Kofi Annan hinted in October 1999 that quick elections might work against the goal of building peace (Perlez, 1999) . But none of these delays has exceeded one year. Rapid liberalization remains at the core of the peacekeeping formula, 16 despite mounting evidence that hasty democratization can, in at least some circumstances, work against the goal of establishing a stable and lasting peace.
According to its backers, trusteeship might reduce pressures on international agencies to rush war-shattered states through comprehensive political and economic reforms, and that a more gradual and phased process of liberalization (as opposed to the prevailing 'shock therapy' approach) would be less likely to produce destabilizing side-effects. Rather than hurrying the transition to liberal market democracy, international trustees would be under no obligation to hold elections, or even to begin the process of political or economic liberalization, until conditions were deemed propitious for such reforms. In other words, although the ultimate goal of trusteeship would be to prepare non-self-governing territories for independence and democratic self-government, this could involve a long period of non-democratic international administration -in effect, a temporary tutelary dictatorship. David Rieff (1999) acknowledges that this would be 'tantamount to calling for a recolonization of part of the world', but he argues that the only alternative is to accept continued 'barbarism'. As Peter Lyon (1993) puts it, 'UN trusteeship would almost certainly be an improvement on the anarchical conditions of the several quasi-states the world has now.'
The third argument for trusteeship builds upon the first two argumentsthe most effective means of establishing new governmental institutions in war-shattered states is to rebuild these institutions from scratch, to staff them with international personnel, and then to gradually replace these officials with adequately trained and politically non-partisan locals (Paris, forthcoming) . Because a trusteeship system would be geared toward the long-term administration of war-shattered states, rather than simply overseeing the reconstitution of governmental institutions in these states, trusteeship is believed to offer a more promising mechanism for the creation of durable and functioning governmental institutions. Most peacekeeping missions have not involved themselves extensively in running the governments of host states, with the exception of Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo. In Cambodia, the United Nations was authorized to take over much of the governmental administration, but in practice made little attempt to do so, choosing instead to oversee the operations of only a few elements of the national government (Boutros-Ghali, 1999: 33) . In Bosnia, the international community's powers were also extensive on paper, but in practice peacekeepers have been reluctant to exert these powers, creating a situation that one commentator calls a 'halfway trusteeship' (Bosco, 1999) .
The missions in East Timor and Kosovo have come closest to full-fledged international trusteeship. In both cases, international agencies have been involved in reconstituting new governmental institutions. Both missions, however, have pushed quickly -some say too quickly -to transfer governmental authority back to local parties before assuring that the conditions for stable self-government are in place. In East Timor, for instance, the United Nations moved quickly to terminate its transitional administration of the territory by early 2002, roughly two years after it began, despite warnings about the dangers of 'precipitate' withdrawal of the international mission from East Timorese Nobel laureate José Ramos-Horta (LUSA, 2001) . Indeed, UN officials fully expected that the operation would be terminated before it had even completed the process of training enough Timorese to run the territory's new government.
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In Kosovo, international administrators have also insisted that early elections and the transfer of decision-making power to local politicians be 'top priorities', even though many observers have challenged the notion that rapid democratization in Kosovo will foster peace -Kosovo remains a province of Yugoslavia, and elections in the territory risk producing European Journal of International Relations 9(3) a provincial government that will insist on the formal separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia -a demand that international peacekeepers oppose on the grounds that it might spark renewed war in the region. At the same time, international officials have been reluctant to exercise their full powers in Kosovo, including the power to bar extremist politicians from positions of public authority, apparently out of fear of 'seeming overly colonial' (Rhode, 2000) . Speedy democratization is one way of alleviating these fears because it offers international agencies with an opportunity to hand over decisionmaking authority to elected local officials rather than to retain the reins of government in their own hands. But the very point of trusteeship, according to its supporters, is not to hand over the reins of government until the trustees are reasonably sure that the institutions of the state, and the local parties who would run those institutions, will survive the transition to selfrule without a new explosion of violence.
How the Kosovo mission will ultimately turn out remains to be seen, but one thing is already clear -international peacekeepers in both East Timor and Kosovo have rushed as fast as they could to democratize and liberalize these societies and to terminate their responsibilities as administrators of these territories. Even though the Kosovo and Timor missions have been more involved in governmental administration than most other peacekeeping missions, these missions represent, at most, a form of 'trusteeship light' -both operations fall short of the more open-ended, gradual and thoroughgoing version of trusteeship that, according to its proponents, is more likely to produce states that can survive as peaceful, self-governing democracies. As David Rhode (2000) writes in regard to Kosovo, 'The key to stabilizing Kosovo does not lie in political gestures, rushed elections, or short-term steps that keep the province out of the headlines. . . . The solution will be much more difficult. It requires a firm commitment to a politically aggressive, properly funded, long-term mission. ' Finally, some commentators also argue that a new trusteeship system would offer a solution to problems that have arisen from the decentralized and improvised organization of peacekeeping missions. When the international community performs transitional governance functions in warshattered states, it does so 'on a wing and a prayer', cobbling together personnel and resources from a variety of sources (Economist, 2000) . Even the UN Secretary-General acknowledges that the East Timor mission 'had to be assembled ad hoc' and consequently lacked 'important expertise in a number of fields' (United Nations, 2000: para. 64). Further, once deployed to the field, the alphabet soup of international agencies have rarely cooperated to the extent that mission planners had hoped (for example, see Erlanger, 1999) . Institutional turf battles are common not only between the UN and other international organizations involved in peacekeeping, but among the various components of the UN system itself. In response to this and other problems, a recent high-profile report on peacekeeping -the socalled Brahimi Report (2000), named after the former Algerian foreign minister who headed the review -raised the possibility of creating a 'dedicated and distinct responsibility center . . . somewhere within the United Nations system' in order to direct transitional administration efforts. Arguments for the establishment of a centralized trusteeship mechanism follow a similar logic -in the absence of adequate preparation and clear direction, international efforts to rehabilitate war-shattered states are less likely to succeed. As David Rieff (1999) bluntly puts it, 'the current ad hoc-ism is . . . unsustainable'.
There are many reasons that the United Nations and other peacekeeping agencies might be reluctant to endorse a comprehensive trusteeship strategy in lieu of its current approach to peacekeeping. For instance, these agencies might perceive that they lack the necessary expertise or personnel to carry out this task, or they might be concerned that such a strategy would be too costly, or that trusteeship would be less effective at fostering peace than current approaches to peacekeeping. All of these prudential concerns are plausible reasons for rejecting the resuscitation of full-fledged trusteeship. But it is also possible that trusteeship could be ruled out on normative grounds -as a violation of the principle of state sovereignty, and an unacceptable reintroduction of 'colonialism'. A few commentators have hypothesized that such normative concerns effectively preclude any serious consideration of long-term trusteeship. Adam Roberts (1994: 23) argues, for example, that trusteeship is a non-starter because 'old-fashioned forms of direct exercise of dominance are out of fashion'. Robert Jackson (1998) concurs, arguing that any attempt to resuscitate the UN's trusteeship system would be condemned as a violation of the organization's commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs, and that the trusteeship system 'was expected to go out of business when all dependent territories were independent. It was not intended to transfer already independent states back to a quasi-colonial status.' Other observers make similar arguments: that trusteeship is 'profoundly disturbing to many governments and observers' because it 'smacks of neo-colonialism' (Marks, 1999; Talbott, 1992; Taylor, 1992) .
How can we determine which, if any, of these concerns about trusteeship are paramount in the thinking of those who conduct peacekeeping operations? One method is to listen to UN official themselves. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was once asked about the possibility of reviving a trusteeship system, and his response was revealing. He did not mention any of the prudential considerations listed above -cost, effectiveness, or the like. Rather, he ruled out trusteeship solely on the grounds that it would be a normatively inappropriate strategy for the United Nations to pursue. 'The concept of trusteeship is finished,' he said, 'It dealt with certain member-states who were former colonies. Current international public opinion and the member-states will never accept [it]' (Boutros-Ghali, 1993: 292) . The idea of trusteeship, he affirmed, is 'against the principle of the United Nations ' (1993, emphasis added) .
To determine whether the view expressed by Boutros-Ghali was widely shared among UN officials, I interviewed six senior officials in New York on 11-12 January 2001. Five held positions in the Secretariat; one worked for a UN specialized agency that participates in peacekeeping. Only one of these six officials was willing to be quoted by name -Andrew Mack, an Australian International Relations scholar who at that time headed the secretary-general's strategic planning unit and has since returned to academe. In February 2001, I conducted one further interview by electronic mail with another official involved in peacekeeping work in the United Nations Development Program. I also subsequently contacted one of the previous interview subjects by electronic mail to clarify an earlier response.
I asked all seven officials whether the UN was considering proposals for establishing a new trusteeship system for collapsed states, and I summarized David Rieff's (1999) arguments for such a system. One of the seven interview subjects declined to address the issue at all. The remaining six respondents, including Mack, expressed a common view that the prospect of creating a new trusteeship system within the UN was virtually nil. They also indicated that, to their knowledge, these proposals had received no serious attention within the UN Secretariat. When asked why, respondents offered several possible explanations -lack of member state interest in such a plan, the cost of creating such a system during a time of frugality within the organization and the lack of institutional resources to manage long-term trusteeships -all of which were prudential reasons for not giving trusteeship serious consideration. But further questioning revealed that these prudential concerns had in fact not emerged in discussions within the Secretariat, and -more importantly -six of the seven officials agreed that such discussions were unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future because, as Boutros-Ghali suggested, they expected that proposals aimed at reviving full-fledged trusteeship would be widely viewed as contrary to the post-colonial role of the United Nations. Three respondents noted that the UN Charter expressly prohibits the placing of any member state -that is, any state whose independence has been formally recognized -under United Nations trusteeship. Article 78 of the Charter reads, 'The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.' More generally, the UN has also long stood for decolonization and the liberation of dependent peoples from foreign rule.
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Officials also anticipated principled opposition to the idea of trusteeship from developing countries in particular. In the words of one official, developing states would be likely to view the establishment of a new trusteeship mechanism as a 'Trojan Horse for societal re-engineering'. This opinion was echoed by all of the respondents (with the exception of the individual who declined to comment). While the expected opposition of certain member states to trusteeship might be considered a prudential calculation along the lines of those described earlier, in fact it is different, because the officials were anticipating that developing member states would reject trusteeship on normative grounds -as contrary to the UN's commitment to uphold the principle of non-interference and self-determination. Furthermore, the officials themselves generally agreed with this assessment -that resuscitating a full-fledged trusteeship would violate UN principles. By all appearances, they had internalized these norms in their consideration of which policy options were worthy of serious consideration. One official stated, 'There is a natural disinclination [within the Secretariat] towards what might be perceived as the neocolonial role of the UN.' When this official was asked to clarify whether the establishment of long-term trusteeship would be perceived in this manner, he answered, 'of course', and added that this perception made trusteeship a 'non-starter'. In short, there is no evidence that prudential considerations have figured in the UN's decision calculus regarding trusteeship at all. Rather, the public and private statements of UN officials suggest that the idea of trusteeship has been rejected in principle as a violation of the organization's normative commitment to anti-colonialism and state sovereignty, and that further consideration of the trusteeship option was therefore rendered unnecessary.
While this evidence is more suggestive than definitive, the reactions of the former Secretary-General and other UN officials to the idea of reviving trusteeship adds weight to the notion that logics of appropriateness influence the practice of peacekeeping in important ways. Not only is the Secretariat averse to acting in a manner that might violate global cultural norms, including norms that prohibit intrusion in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, but the UN seems unwilling even to give serious consideration to trusteeship as a possible alternative to peacekeeping. This is not to say that the logic of effectiveness plays no role in intra-UN deliberations about peacekeeping. On the contrary, the organization is constantly seeking to identify 'lessons learned' from its peacekeeping experience in order to improve techniques for the future; and we noted above that there are many practical questions relating to the actual implementation of a trusteeship strategy that would have to be considered. But if the logic of effectiveness were all that mattered in these deliberations, we would expect the trusteeship option to be evaluated solely or primarily on its practicability as a strategy for building peace in war-shattered states. This, however, is not what we see in practice. The logic of appropriateness -that is, concerns about legitimacy and propriety -appears to have disqualified trusteeship as a serious policy option within the UN, and consequently little or no effort was made to evaluate the practical effects of widely publicized trusteeship proposals. Thus, the norms of global culture seem not only to prescribe certain approaches to peacekeeping, but also to constrain the range of peacekeeping policies that international agencies can realistically pursue.
The Conflicting Imperatives of Global Culture
Because the trusteeship option has not been tested, no one can know for certain whether a full-fledged trusteeship system would actually do a better job at promoting peace and stable self-government in collapsed states than the current approach to peacekeeping. But the proponents of trusteeship have made a compelling case that prevailing peacekeeping practices are deficient in important ways and that the trusteeship strategy might remedy some of these deficiencies. The observation that the United Nations is disinclined even to consider the trusteeship option has important implications -it suggests that peacekeepers may, in effect, be sacrificing operational effectiveness (i.e. the building of a stable and lasting peace) because they are concerned about perceptions of international propriety (i.e. the need to abide by international norms). According to the last two UN secretaries-general, the purpose of peacekeeping in post-conflict situations is 'to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 21 ). To the extent that the United Nations is sacrificing operational effectiveness in the name of international propriety, its behavior is at odds with the declared purpose of peacekeeping.
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999) call this type of behavior 'dysfunctional' and argue that it is not uncommon among international organizations. They posit that cultural norms, both within international organizations and in the surrounding environment, explain such behavior. Cultural norms within IOs are the rules, rituals and beliefs that shape the way in which the individuals who work in these organizations interpret and respond to the outside world. Barnett gives an example of internal cultural norms leading to dysfunctional behavior by an IO -the organizational culture of the United Nations, he argues, contributed to the world body's inaction in response to news of the 1994 massacres in Rwanda (Barnett, 1997 (Barnett, , 2002 . The findings of this article, by contrast, lend support to Barnett and Finnemore's contention that external cultural norms, or global culture, can induce international organizations to act dysfunctionally -specifically, by creating incentives for these agencies to dismiss a strategy that could potentially achieve the stated objective of peacekeeping more effectively than current methods do.
In fact, global culture appears to place contradictory pressures on peacekeepers -pressures that reflect contradictions and tensions that exist among the norms of global culture and, specifically, in the prevailing model of legitimate statehood. On one hand, as we have seen, these norms enjoin peacekeepers to support efforts aimed at transforming war-shattered countries into modern, liberal states. On the other hand, these norms prohibit peacekeepers from interfering in the domestic affairs of any state. Faced with these competing demands, peacekeepers have adopted a strategy of peacethrough-liberalization, but one that emphasizes the fastest possible transfer of governmental power to local actors and the expeditious departure of the peacekeepers from the country in order to minimize the degree of external interference in the country. Yet a more interventionist form of peacekeeping, such as the trusteeship model that a number of commentators have advocated, may be better suited to transforming war-shattered countries into peaceful, self-governing democracies. Peacekeepers are consequently left in a quandary -global culture legitimizes the goals of peacekeeping while delegitimizing the means that may be needed to achieve these goals. The result, as Barnett and Finnemore put it, is apparently dysfunctional behavior by peacekeeping agencies. If one accepts that global culture places pressure on international actors to behave in certain ways and to avoid other types of behavior, it is difficult to conceive of how the evolution of peacekeeping could have turned out differently, and the reluctance of peacekeeping agencies to experiment with trusteeship seems an almost predictable result of the pressures and constraints of global culture. This is not to argue that global culture 'determines' the nature of peacekeeping, but rather that this culture shapes the design and practice of peace operations in recurring and discernible ways. International agencies, I have argued, tend to behave in accordance with global cultural norms and tend to avoid behaving in ways that might contravene these norms; in other words, it is theoretically possible that peacekeepers could choose to defy international norms by establishing a new trusteeship system for collapsed states. This scenario seems unlikely, however, given the United Nations' apparent unwillingness even to consider the construction of such a system. As long as trusteeship 'smacks of colonialism' and seems to violate the norm of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, the advocates of fullfledged trusteeship are unlikely to receive much of a hearing in the world's leading peacekeeping agencies.
The converse is also true -if, for some reason, trusteeship ceased to be viewed as a throwback to colonialism and an intrusion on state sovereignty, the prospects of establishing a new international trusteeship system would increase substantially. Since international norms are not fixed, but evolve in conjunction with international behavior, erosion of the non-interference norm could eventually reduce concerns about the propriety of international trusteeship. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, proponents of trusteeship could work to change perceptions of the relationship between a new trusteeship system and existing international norms, perhaps by emphasizing that any such system would seek to create the conditions that would permit war-torn countries to manage their own affairs peacefully and independently. If international trusteeship were viewed as a technique of upholding rather than undermining the principle of state sovereignty, there would likely be fewer normative impediments to establishing such a system. Although such legitimation of the trusteeship strategy would still not make the implementation of this strategy inevitable, it would at least permit peacekeeping agencies to give serious consideration to the practicalities of trusteeship rather than dismissing the strategy a priori as a violation of international norms.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to illustrate the benefits of exploring connections between peacekeeping and theoretical debates in other subfields. From the perspective of sociology's world polity theory, peacekeeping operations are not only techniques for managing conflicts; they are also the products, the promulgators and the prisoners of global culture. They are products of global culture in the sense that international norms legitimize certain types of peacekeeping operations with particular goals. They are promulgators of global culture in that peacekeepers seek to remake war-shattered states in accordance with the prevailing principles of legitimate statehood. And they are prisoners of global culture in the sense that peacekeeping agencies seem to lack the freedom to pursue peacekeeping strategies that violate, or risk violating, global cultural norms, even if these strategies are potentially more effective at fostering peace than the peacekeeping policies currently in use. In all of these respects, world polity theory deepens our understanding of why peacekeepers do what they do. Further research is needed to identify the precise mechanisms by which global culture constrains the practice of peacekeeping, and to explore the interplay between logics of appropriateness and logics of effectiveness in the design and conduct of these operations.
Notes
The Franck (1992: 65-6) . 13. URL (consulted August 18) http://www.upd.oas.org/NewUPD/mainlinks/ updgeneral.htm. 14. Cited in Nelson and Eglinton (1992: 16) . See also Nelson and Eglinton (1996: 170-2). 15. To date, only one operation launched since the end of the Cold War has followed the model of traditional, Cold War-era peacekeeping -an observer mission that was deployed to the frontier between Ethiopia and Eritrea as part of the ceasefire agreement between these two countries. 16. An interesting variation of this formula was employed in Afghanistan, where an Interim Authority was constituted through a traditional meeting of clans, known as a Loya Jirga. However, the novelty of this arrangement should not be overstated, because the Interim Authority was required to hold 'free and fair elections' for a 'representative government' within two years of the Loya Jirga's first meeting. See the 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions', URL (consulted September 2002) http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/ agreement.htm. 17. Off-the-record interview with a senior official at UN headquarters on 11 January 2001; and citations in Mydans (2000) . 18. General Assembly Resolution 1514, for example, passed in 1960 and considered by many developing countries as the UN's 'second charter', declares that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination' and 'inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence'.
